statements and opaque contexts are crucial concepts in semantics. They explore how language refers to things and how meaning can change in certain contexts. These ideas challenge our understanding of how words relate to the world.
Opaque contexts, like belief reports and modal statements, show that swapping out words with the same meaning doesn't always work. This raises questions about how language conveys information and how we understand the relationship between words and reality.
Identity Statements and Opaque Contexts
Identity statements and opaque contexts
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Semantic Features of the Concept “Sky” in Different Cultures View original
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Using unmarked contexts in nominal lexical semantic classification - ACL Anthology View original
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Frontiers | Transition From Sublexical to Lexico-Semantic Stimulus Processing View original
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Identity statements assert two expressions refer to the same entity
"Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens" (author's real name and pen name)
"The morning star is the evening star" (both refer to Venus)
"Clark Kent is Superman" (superhero's alter ego and true identity)
Opaque contexts are linguistic environments where substituting co-referential terms does not always preserve the sentence's truth value
Belief reports: "Lois Lane believes Superman can fly" vs. "Lois Lane believes Clark Kent can fly"
Modal contexts: "2 + 2 = 4 is necessarily true" vs. "The number of planets in the solar system = 4 is necessarily true"
Quotation contexts: "'Cicero' has six letters" vs. "'Tully' has six letters" (both refer to the same Roman orator)
Challenges in opaque contexts
principle seems to fail in opaque contexts
Principle states co-referential terms should be interchangeable without affecting a sentence's truth value
Frege's puzzle highlights identity statements can be informative, despite seeming trivially true
"Hesperus is Phosphorus" is informative, even though both names refer to Venus
Co-referential terms may have different cognitive significance for a speaker
Leads to different truth values when substituted in opaque contexts
Solutions for identity puzzles
distinguishes between an expression's reference (Bedeutung) and sense (Sinn)
Sense is the referent's mode of presentation
Accounts for cognitive significance and substitutivity failure in opaque contexts
Russellian theory of descriptions analyzes definite descriptions as quantified expressions rather than referring expressions
Solves Frege's puzzle by denying identity statements are genuine identity statements
argues proper names are rigid designators, referring to the same entity in all possible worlds
Explains substitutivity failure in modal contexts by distinguishing between necessity and aprioricity
Implications for meaning theories
Opaque contexts challenge the compositionality principle
Principle states a complex expression's meaning is determined by its parts' meanings and their combination
In opaque contexts, the whole sentence's meaning is not always determined by its parts' meanings
, which views a term's meaning as simply its referent, faces difficulties accounting for cognitive significance and substitutivity failure in opaque contexts
distinguishes between two aspects of meaning
Primary (a priori, cognitive significance)
Secondary intension (a posteriori, truth-conditional content)
Aims to reconcile Fregean and Kripkean insights about meaning and reference in opaque contexts